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Abstract 
 
The paper provides a general framework for examining how governance choice affects 
competitive advantage. I argue that firms rely on assets for competing, and that these assets 
can be accessed by different governance structures (i.e., they can be in- or outsourced). The 
transaction cost economics framework is used to expose strengths and weaknesses of 
governance structures with respect to creating and sustaining competitive advantage. The 
result is a tradeoff to consider when choosing how to access an asset. A number of 
implications are forwarded, and the usefulness of the framework is demonstrated by means of 
an application to the famous General Motors - Fisher Body case. This points to the potential 
of using transaction cost economics in the analysis of competitive strategy, as well as to the 
shortcomings of the existing transaction cost economics framework in explaining governance 
choice. The framework also represents a way to integrate transaction cost economics with the 
resource-based view and industrial organization. 
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Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage: 
The Role of Governance Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) occupies a central place in the strategy field. While it has 
been widely applied to strategic issues of corporate and organizational nature, it has been 
scarcely used with respect to competitive strategy issues (Foss, 2002). However, taking 
account of transaction costs and contractual issues is crucial when competing. Based on the 
view that firms rely on access to assets to compete, I argue that the way an asset is accessed 
influences the asset’s ability to aid in creating and sustaining competitive advantage, a key 
notion in the resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and industrial 
organization (IO) (Porter, 1985; Tirole, 1988). This is due to different governance structures 
having different performance attributes when considering transaction costs and contractual 
arrangements (Williamson, 1985, 1991). The result is a tradeoff in strengths and weaknesses 
with respect to the firm’s competitive advantage when making the governance choice (i.e., the 
choice to in- or outsource). 
The contribution of the present paper lies in several respects. The primary contribution 
is the demonstration that the existing TCE framework can fruitfully be applied to competitive 
strategy by illuminating how the governance choice implies weaknesses and strengths for the 
firm’s competitive advantage. This is a novel way to apply TCE (although hinted at by 
Williamson, 1999). Some of the conclusions are familiar, but deducing them in this manner is 
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new, and shows the strength of TCE. However, the paper also challenges the existing TCE 
literature by pointing to other determinants of governance choice than those traditionally 
employed (primarily asset specificity), namely considerations for a firm’s competitive 
advantage. As I rely on RBV and IO to describe what creates and sustains competitive 
advantage, and further use TCE to focus the analysis, I am implicitly taking an integrative 
position in the recent strategy debate on the proper economic foundations for research in 
strategy (Foss, 1999). 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 lays out issues that are relevant 
to creating and sustaining a competitive advantage. I focus on access to assets, making the 
basis of the analysis close to that of RBV. However, lessons from both RBV and IO are 
drawn in. Section 3 applies the governance structure framework developed by Williamson 
(1985, 1991) to explicate how the governance choice affects the competitive abilities of the 
firm. There is a tradeoff to consider when making the choice between market, hybrid and 
hierarchy. This tradeoff is with respect to creating competitive advantage (where issues such 
as differentiation, bureaucratic costs and coordination are particularly pertinent) and 
sustaining competitive advantage (where issues such as protection, flexibility and 
commitment are particularly pertinent). Section 4 discusses various implications of the 
analysis. The characteristics of the asset, the overall competitive strategy of the firm, and the 
role assigned to the asset in the competitive strategy influence the governance choice. Other 
implications are forwarded as well. In section 5 I apply the framework to the famous General 
Motors – Fisher Body Case (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). Recent case studies 
(Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000; Coase, 2000; Freeland 2000; Langlois and 
Robertson, 1989) have challenged the established hold-up explanation and pointed to other 
explanations for the acquisition, most of which concern competitive strategy. It is argued that 
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the presented framework accommodates the new explanations, and that the different views 
therefore all are consistent with TCE, and not mutually exclusive. Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage 
 
To be able to conduct the analysis, I will first give a description of some ways a firm can 
create and sustain a competitive advantage, in large part drawing on the IO and RBV ideas on 
competitive strategy. The picture is not complete, but emphasizes areas TCE can relate to. 
Competitive strategy is concerned with creating above average profits by competing in 
the market. This effort concerns both creating a competitive advantage, as well as sustaining 
the competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). 
The present analysis is concerned with how governance choice affects this process. To 
analyze this I will focus on the assets that go into the process. In other words, the view will be 
that the firm relies on assets to create and sustain the competitive advantage. Assets should be 
thought of broadly, not unlike the resources of RBV, which Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) 
describes as “anything that can be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm”. The 
key proposition here is that assets can be accessed in different ways, and that the competitive 
abilities will be affected by the choice.1 In this section I focus on ways to create and sustain 
competitive advantage, leaving the analysis of the effects of governance choice to the next 
section. 
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Creating competitive advantage  
 
To create a competitive advantage the firm must necessarily drive a wedge between the 
average cost of inputs and the price of the end product. Porter (1985) identifies two basic 
strategies that can be pursued to achieve this goal: differentiation or cost leadership.2 In order 
to create an advantage, the firm either has to have lower costs than competitors for a 
comparable product, or have a differentiated product for which a premium above the added 
costs of such a strategy can be charged. Note that even though Porter distinguishes between 
the two, in this context I will regard having a cost advantage over competitors as a special 
case of differentiation, the differentiation being in the cost dimension. Thus, to create a 
difference between price and costs, the firm has to be differentiated by some dimension from 
competitors. As I will focus on competitive ability resting on access to assets, this translates 
into the firm accessing an asset at differential (i.e., more favorable) terms than competitors or 
accessing attractive assets that are not accessed by competitors. 
The RBV stresses differentiation as well, although their focus is different. Heterogeneity 
stemming from some unique resource(s) of the firm is emphasized (Peteraf, 1993). As Barney 
(1991) argues, if firms are homogenous, no one firm will have a competitive advantage. Both 
views thus point to the value of being able to exclude competitors from accessing an asset that 
enables differentiation, be it with respect to the firm itself, the end product, the inputs, or the 
buyers (market). Of course, differentiation in itself is insufficient to create a competitive 
advantage – the differentiation has to be with respect to a profitable dimension. The following 
are some factors that help create a competitive advantage. 
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It follows directly that lowering costs is a way to create a competitive advantage, ceteris 
paribus. Thus, if a firm can access an asset in a way that saves costs, this is potentially a way 
to create a competitive advantage. 
Another factor is the ability to coordinate the use of complementary assets. Many assets 
create more value in conjunction than apart. The ability to coordinate assets that are 
complementary can thus aid in creating a competitive advantage. 
  
Sustaining competitive advantage 
 
Prolonging the time a competitive advantage is enjoyed is profitable, ceteris paribus. Thus, 
sustaining the competitive advantage is an important issue (Peteraf, 1993). The competitive 
position needs to be protected from appropriation attempts from other parties, notably 
suppliers, buyers and competitors (Porter, 1985). 
To sustain the competitive advantage, the firm should protect its terms of access to the 
assets that the firm relies on for its competitive advantage. If it does not, it is at the risk of 
losing the advantage. The risk also concerns access being interrupted or terminated (Penrose, 
1995, ch. 7). It can thus be beneficial to protect the terms of access as well as access itself. 
Protection is needed both against the owner of the asset ex post worsening the terms of access 
(for instance, by increasing the price or obstructing access), and against another party seizing 
control of the asset to engage in appropriation attempts. Competitors provide a special threat 
in this respect. First of all, since they are in a similar situation to the firm, they have a higher 
chance than other parties to realize the value of the asset. Secondly, a competitor has a direct 
benefit from hurting the firm’s ability to compete as this strengthens the competitor’s own 
position. 
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If the firm relies on an asset for differentiating it from competitors, the ability to keep 
competitors excluded from accessing the asset is vital (Peteraf, 1993). If competitors gain 
access to the same asset, thus diluting the difference between the firm and the competitors, the 
competitive advantage is lost. This again points to the importance of continually excluding 
competitors from accessing assets if the firm’s competitive advantage is to be sustained. As 
Barney (1991) stresses, this is not enough if competitors can merely imitate the asset. Thus, 
protecting the asset from imitation is also an issue in sustaining the competitive advantage. 
In a dynamic and uncertain environment, flexibility has a role in sustaining competitive 
advantage (Sanchez, 1995). By flexibility I mean the ability to alter rapidly and with few 
costs. A firm can have flexibility both with respect to which assets are accessed, and to how 
an asset is used. Consider the former. If the cost of accessing an asset at some point exceeds 
the benefit, then the ability to terminate access rapidly and without costs will be an advantage, 
as continued access will damage the firm’s competitive advantage. On a similar note, some 
asset with superior ability to sustain the competitive advantage than an asset already accessed 
might turn up, giving the firm a competitive advantage if it is able to switch rapidly and with 
few costs to accessing the alternative asset (Langlois, 1991). Thus, the ability to flexibly 
access assets can aid in sustaining the competitive advantage. Similarly, the ability to direct 
assets to profitable uses that turn up creates an advantage (Sanchez, 2000). That is, being 
flexible as to how the asset is used can help sustain the competitive advantage.  
Lastly, a central issue of IO is the beneficial effect of credibly committing to strategies 
(Lien, 2001; Tirole, 1988, ch. 8). For instance, a firm credibly over-investing in capacity ex 
ante can either reduce the investment of competitors or deter entry outright: competitors 
aware that the firm has a large capacity expect fiercer competition should it start competing, 
and react to this by reducing competition. These strategies will often involve a loss for the 
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firm in the ex post situation should a competitor enter. Hence, being in-flexibility ex post is 
essential for being able to commit credibly ex ante. In other words, in-flexibility can be 
valuable as it creates commitment to a strategy. Note that the in-flexibility has to be with 
respect to both termination (so the firm cannot simply stop accessing the asset) and use (so the 
firm cannot simply use the asset for something else). 
 
Comments 
 
The picture I have given of competitive strategy is not meant to be complete, but meant to 
supply a basis on which to apply TCE. In particular, I have left out issues of innovation and 
learning. Although clearly important for both creating and sustaining the competitive 
advantage, TCE does not address these issues adequately (Williamson, 1999). Therefore, TCE 
does not in its present form provide substantial insights as to why the ability to innovate and 
learn might differ across governance structures (although Teece (1986) has explored how to 
secure returns from innovation). That is the reason for the omission, and an indication of 
where additional insights might come from. 
Similarly, RBV stresses how firms are heterogeneous and hence how different assets 
can exist in the firm and outside the firm. These differences undoubtedly influence the 
governance choice (Argyres, 1996; Langlois, 1991). Additionally, two firms facing the same 
choice might act differently because they ex ante access different assets or access assets 
differently (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). These issues are not the focus of the analysis 
here. This analysis will (in the spirit of Williamson, 1991) take assets for given, and thus not 
explore how these differences in initial assets influence the decision, but rather focus on what 
we might call the inherent differences between governance structures. Even though firms are 
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inclined to choose one governance form over another due to their initial, differential position, 
the inherent strengths and weaknesses of governance structures still apply. 
 
3. The Effects of Governance Choice for Competitive Advantage 
 
As already stated, the main idea in the present paper is that the way the asset is accessed is 
going to affect the firm’s ability to both create and sustain its competitive advantage. The 
TCE treatment of governance structures exposes the ways in which this occurs. The following 
explains how in detail. 
TCE applies a contractual view to economic organization, and distinguishes between 
three distinct governance structures for handling access to assets – market, hybrid, and 
hierarchy (Williamson, 1985, 1991). The market corresponds to buying in the market at 
whatever terms exist each time access is needed. The hybrid involves some long-term 
contract, which spans from simple agreements to more elaborate partnerships. Handling 
access by hierarchy corresponds to handling access internally. If we consider a shipping 
company that needs access to a port, it is a choice between paying to dock each time the need 
arises (market), signing an agreement with the owner of the port specifying the terms of future 
access (hybrid), and buying (or constructing) a port (hierarchy). TCE describes how each 
governance structure is characterized by internally consistent attributes, one of which is a 
distinct contract law regime. Furthermore, the market is characterized by strong incentives 
and weak administrative controls, making it strong at autonomous adaptation, and weak at 
coordinative adaptation. The hierarchy is characterized by strong administrative controls and 
weak incentives, making it strong at coordinative adaptation and weak at autonomous 
adaptation. The hybrid is in-between, being semi-strong in all respects. TCE holds that 
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transactions are aligned with governance structures in a mainly transaction cost economizing 
way. In this respect asset specificity (lost value if the asset is redeployed) is seen as the main 
determinant of economic organization, and increased specificity leads to a move from market 
over more elaborate hybrids to hierarchy3.  
In the spirit of TCE, the analysis below is a comparative analysis of governance 
structures when we take an asset for given. In this way the inherent strengths and weaknesses 
of the governance structures are explicated. 
Table 1 illustrates the differential attributes based on the discussion that follows. 
Strengths and weaknesses are seen from the viewpoint of a firm accessing a given asset. 
  
--------------- Insert table 1 around here --------------- 
 
Creating competitive advantage 
 
Differentiation. The governance structures’ differential capacity for control has consequences 
for an asset’s ability to aid in differentiating a firm from competitors. This is because the 
more control the firm has over an asset, the better is its ability to exclude other firms from 
access to the asset. If the firm can exclude a competitor from accessing an asset, it can 
differentiate itself from the competitor in this respect. 
Consider a situation where the firm has access to an asset that is also accessed by a 
competitor. As the administrative controls are strong in the hierarchy, access by hierarchy 
gives the best ability to exclude competitors from access to an asset. For instance, a shipping 
company owning a port can exclude competitors from using the port if it wants to 
differentiate itself in this respect. Of course, only if the competitor does not have a long-term 
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contract giving it the right to access can access be terminated without problems. But even if a 
competitor has a long-term contract, the shipping company can deny the competitor access 
and take the resulting lawsuit (or other repercussion). The point is that the hierarchy is 
superior to other governance structures, not that exclusion is always unproblematic. If access 
is secured by a hybrid, there is some ability to exclude others from access. This can be either 
because the two parties are in some kind of collaboration, where each party takes the needs of 
the other party into account. Alternatively, the terms of a contract can specify various degrees 
of exclusivity, which in effect exclude competitors, either explicitly (port owner committing 
not to give access to competitors) or implicitly by inherent commitments (for instance, the 
port owner committing all the port’s capacity to the shipping company). The hybrid thus has 
an ability to exclude others, although not as strong as the hierarchy – the administrative 
controls being weaker. If access is upheld in the market, the ability to exclude others is 
minimal. There are no administrative controls or contracts to rely on. The only way to exclude 
others is by exhausting the “capacity” associated with the asset, for example the shipping 
company continuously using the whole capacity of the port. This is clearly not very effective. 
Thus, the ability to exclude and thus potential for differentiation is greatest in the hierarchy 
and weakest in the market. Ceteris paribus, the ability to create a competitive advantage 
based on an asset is greatest if governed by hierarchy and smallest if accessed in the market, 
the hybrid being in-between. 
 
Low bureaucratic cost. One performance attribute where governance structures differ is with 
respect to bureaucratic costs. As reducing costs is a means to create a competitive advantage, 
accessing an asset by a governance structure where bureaucratic costs are saved has the 
potential to create a competitive advantage. 
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As Williamson (1985, 1991) argues, incentives are strongest in the market and 
weakest in the firm. This makes parties transacting in the market focus more on costs as they 
bear the costs themselves. On the other hand, those transacting internally do not bear the cots 
themselves and are therefore less cost conscious. Simultaneously, transacting in a hierarchy 
implies that a costly administrative apparatus is in place, while such an apparatus is not 
needed for transacting in the market. If using a hybrid, the incentives are dampened (relative 
to the market), while some apparatus is needed to oversee compliance with the contract etc. 
Thus, the bureaucratic costs are highest in the hierarchy and lowest in the market. In other 
words, the market has greatest potential to create a competitive advantage in this respect, and 
the hierarchy least. Thus, the market is inherently strongest, the hybrid semi-strong, and the 
hierarchy weak. 
 
Coordination. A hierarchy is superior at coordination as it employs low powered incentives 
and has the ability to resolve disputes by fiat (Williamson, 1985, 1991). In hybrids, the semi-
strong incentives of the autonomous (self-interested) parties lessen their ability to cooperate. 
But due to the semi-strong administrative controls and long-term contract in place, some 
coordinative ability is kept. If access is made in the market, the owner of the asset will behave 
individualistically due to the strong incentives, and there are no administrative controls in 
place. The ability to coordinate the use of the asset with the firm’s assets will thus be weak. In 
other words, the potential to gain a competitive advantage by coordinating the use of the asset 
with the other assets of the firm is strongest if using hierarchy, semi-strong if using a hybrid, 
and weakest if using the market. 
A recent case from the shipping industry illustrates this point. A. P. Møller, a Danish 
shipping company, has just acquired four giant container ships (Berlingske Tidende, 2002). 
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This is counter to the tendency in the business, where shipping companies increasingly rely 
on smaller ships. Part of the problem of the bigger ships is whether ports can handle them. 
However, as A. P. Møller runs many of its ports itself, it can make sure the necessary 
investments are made. In this way, due to its ability to coordinate use of assets (ships and 
ports), A. P. Møller has increased its competitive advantage over competitors who do not 
control ports. 
 
Sustaining competitive advantage 
 
Protection. As already explained above, the hierarchy has best control, the hybrid some 
control, and the market least control. Control enables a superior ability to sustain the 
competitive advantage for several reasons related to protection. 
Greater control means better protection of the terms of access and access itself. Consider 
the shipping company using a port. If the shipping company is accessing the port through the 
market, and in this way simply pays a fee each time it docks, the owner of the port can 
without problem raise the fee or terminate access, and reduce the competitive advantage 
enjoyed by the shipping company. If the shipping company had secured the access through a 
hybrid, that is, by a long-term contract specifying the terms of access, the fee could not be 
raised as easily. Nor would the owner be as inclined to terminate (or interrupt) access as this 
would involve costs (whatever repercussions might be suffered, including a lawsuit). Having 
a long-term contract is no guarantee, as contracts are inherently incomplete and the owner of 
the port might breach it if this proved profitable, but some protection is provided. On the other 
hand, if the shipping company had secured the port by hierarchy, that is, had simply bought it, 
the terms of access would be given, and the competitive advantage would not be threatened 
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this way. Thus, hierarchy is superior at sustaining the competitive advantage, the hybrid 
follows, and the market is worst. 
The concern can be extended to protecting the competitive advantage from any party 
(notably competitors) that realizes the advantage enjoyed and thus realizes the potential for 
appropriating the value, or simply sees an advantage in terminating the firm’s access. Again, 
the different governance structures provide varying degrees of protection against this. If the 
port is owned, the protection against this threat is strong as the shipping company itself 
determines whether it wants to sell or not. If a long-term contract is in place, and the 
ownership of the port changes hands, the new owner might try to appropriate value from the 
shipping company (in order to realize more value himself) by disputing the contracts or cancel 
implicit arrangements in place. For instance, as contracts are invariably incomplete, some 
implicit understanding regarding the exact terms of access can have been in place between the 
shipping company and the former owner of the port. A new owner can insist on upholding 
only the terms explicitly stated in the contract, potentially making the terms of access worse 
for the shipping company. A new owner might also simply disregard the contract and 
terminate access if he feels the costs of this are sufficiently low. Thus, a contract does not 
provide full protection. If access was secured in the market, the new owner can easily change 
the terms of access to the worse, or simply cancel access, as no protection is provided. Again, 
the strong control in the hierarchy makes it best at sustaining the competitive advantage, the 
hybrid being mediocre, and the market worst. 
As explained, having a competitive advantage hinges on being favorably differentiated 
from competitors in some respect. Protecting access to assets that provide this differentiation 
is vital for sustaining the advantage. The more control the firm has over these assets, the 
greater is the ability to keep competitors from gaining access, and the better is the ability to 
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sustain the competitive advantage. This can be illustrated with the example of the shipping 
company accessing a port. Assume the port differentiates the shipping company from 
competitors in the eyes of the buyers of its services. This could be due to greater efficiency 
than other ports, which enables the shipping company to have faster transportation times then 
competitors. If the shipping company is accessing the port through the market, it cannot keep 
competitors from starting to use the port. If competitors realize the potential and start using 
the port it would dilute the difference between the shipping companies by erasing the 
differentiating factor. Thus, the competitive advantage would vanish. If the port was accessed 
by a hybrid, a long-term contract could protect the differentiation. This can be by dictating 
some degree of exclusivity relative to competitors, as explained earlier. However, had the 
firm bought the port, it could keep competitors from accessing the asset at will, and thus 
effectively sustain its competitive advantage. So, due to the ability to keep competitors 
excluded from accessing an asset, the hierarchy is best at sustaining a competitive advantage, 
the hybrid average, and the market worst. 
Another aspect of sustaining the competitive advantage is the ability to keep competitors 
from learning the secrets of an asset, thus keeping them from imitating the asset. Again, the 
ability to keep competitors from learning the secrets of an asset is related to the control the 
firm has over the asset, although the protection will never be as good. If a port is working 
efficiently, keeping others from accessing the port is easier than keeping them from 
duplicating the infrastructure of the port. Still, there is a difference in the ability of 
governance structures to keep competitors from imitating. If the asset is accessed by 
hierarchy, the firm can guard it as it sees fit (even though the protection is not complete). If 
access is secured by a hybrid, parties outside the firm will have knowledge of the asset. At the 
same time, control is not as great, due to contracts being incomplete and the ever-looming 
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possibility of breach. Thus, the secrets are not as well protected. If the asset is accessed 
through the market, the firm has no protection against competitors learning of the asset’s 
secrets. Thus, the secrets of assets are best protected in the hierarchy, and protected least in 
the market. Once again, the competitive advantage is best sustained in the hierarchy. 
All in all, due to the differential protective abilities of governance structures, hierarchy 
is strong at sustaining the competitive advantage, the hybrid semi-strong, and the market 
weak. 
 
Flexibility. As explained in the previous section, there is flexibility in two respects. One is the 
flexibility the firm has to terminate access to an asset, the other is the flexibility the firm has 
to alter an asset to fit it to the needs of the firm. Both give the firm the ability to respond to 
circumstances as they evolve, but in different ways. 
There is a tradeoff with respect to these flexibilities when choosing governance 
structure. Consider the use of market access. Since there is no contract in place, the firm is 
free to simply stop accessing an asset accessed in this way, and the flexibility to terminate 
access is thus strong. However, the flexibility enjoyed with respect to altering the asset is 
weak, as the firm has no control over the asset. If accessed by hybrid, there will be some sort 
of contract in place, implying commitments,4 making it costly to terminate access – either 
because there are inherent commitments that will have to be respected, or because the firm 
chooses to renegade on the agreement, which can lead to costly repercussion. Thus, the exact 
agreement determines the flexibility to terminate, which can be either semi-strong or weak. 
On the other hand, the firm has some control over the asset, giving it some flexibility with 
respect to altering the asset. This can be due to specifications in the contract, or other 
arrangements implying that parties will take each other into account. If the asset is accessed 
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by hierarchy the flexibility to terminate access is reduced, as there are transaction costs 
involved in buying and selling assets. Additionally, a drop in value of an asset to the firm is 
likely to be correlated with the value of the asset to potential buyers. Thus, the flexibility to 
terminate access is semi-strong or weak – the firm can always terminate access, but how 
costly this is depends on the circumstances, which makes it impossible to generally rank 
hybrid and firm in this respect. Meanwhile, the flexibility enjoyed to alter the asset is strong 
in the hierarchy. As the firm has strong administrative controls its ability to change the nature 
of assets is strong. 
To illustrate, take the example of the shipping company. If it is buying access from the 
owner of the port each time access is needed, it is simply a matter of stopping access if the 
value of access turns negative, or another port stars offering access with superior value. 
However, should the shipping company wish to alter the port to accommodate its needs, it is 
at the mercy of the port owner. If the shipping company had signed a long-term contract with 
the owner of the port committing to some terms, it cannot simply stop using the port. Either it 
has to continue paying according to the specified terms, try to renegotiate the contract, or 
breach the contract, all of which involves costs. Thus, the flexibility to terminate access is 
dampened. However, through the contract the shipping company could have made provisions 
for mechanisms that gives it some say as to how the port is, for instance, equipped. If the 
shipping company owned the port, it increases the costs and time delay of terminating access 
(relative to market access). It will have to incur the costs of selling the port, and the potential 
loss associated with such a sale (relative to the expected value when it bought it), if a sale is 
possible at all. Such a loss seems likely if, for instance, the fall in value is due to fall in 
demand of shipping services, where one can expect a correlation between the shipping 
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company’s valuation of the asset and potential buyers’ valuation. On the other hand, the 
shipping company has no problem installing new equipment in the port as it sees fit.  
Thus, due to flexibility to terminate access, competitive advantage is potentially best 
sustained if an asset is accessed in the market, and worse if accessed in a hybrid or in a 
hierarchy. On the other hand, the flexibility to alter the asset makes the hierarchy superior at 
sustaining the competitive advantage, the hybrid being average, and the market worst. There 
is a tradeoff in flexibilities to consider.  
 
Commitment. As explained, commitment to a strategy can serve to sustain the competitive 
advantage. The ability to commit credibly to continue accessing an asset and the commitment 
to using it for a particular purpose differs between governance structures. Commitment is the 
flip side of flexibility. Thus, the governance structures’ abilities in this respect is the mirror 
image of their flexibilities – being weak at flexibility to terminate access results in a strong 
commitment to using the asset, while a weak flexibility to alter an asset results in a strong 
commitment to using the asset in a particular way. Hence, if accessing an asset in the market, 
the firm cannot commit to using the asset, but if it uses it is committed to use it “as it is”. If 
accessing the asset by a hybrid, the firm can commit to using the asset, but is less committed 
to not altering the asset so it can be used differently. In a hierarchy, the firm can also commit 
to using the asset, but has weak commitment to the particular use of the asset.   
If a shipping company wishes to deter entry from competitors by having access to extra 
port capacity, it makes no sense to access the capacity on market terms as the shipping 
company can always terminate access when the competitor enters. In other words, there 
would be no commitment to tough competition ex post. However, it can commit to competing 
in a particular way – if ports are designed to accommodate particular types of ships, the 
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shipping company is committed to competing with this type of ship. If the extra capacity is 
access by a long-term contract, it commits the shipping company to the over-capacity ex post 
– even though the contract can be breached, it could be formed in a way that expectedly made 
breach very costly, and thus unattractive (for instance, a stiff penalty for violating the 
agreement). Thus, should a competitor enter, the capacity would be available, and tough 
competition can be expected. But the commitment to a particular use of the port is weakened 
relative to the market – if the port with minor alterations could be used for other types of 
ships, then the fact that the shipping company has a contract in place can be used to influence 
the owner to make the alterations. Lastly, the excess capacity can be secured by owning the 
port. An investment made in this way would inherently have less sale (or lease) value in an ex 
post competitive situation, as the shipping company would have costs from reselling the port 
capacity and the capacity is bound to lose value (if a competitor has entered the market, 
potential buyers’ valuation of the investment will deflate as using the capacity will squeeze 
margins). Thus, the shipping company could credibly commit to using the over-capacity ex 
post, and in this way deter entry ex ante. At the same time the firm would be weakly 
committed to not altering the port, and can thus not commit to continue to compete with, for 
instance, small ships (instead of altering the port to accommodate larger ships and use these). 
In other words, there is a tradeoff in commitment when choosing governance structure. 
Commitment to using an asset is weak if accessed by market, but semi-strong or strong if 
accessed by hybrid or hierarchy. On the other hand, the commitment to using the asset in a 
particular way is strong if accessed by market, semi-strong if accessed by hybrid, and weak if 
accessed by hierarchy. 
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Comments 
 
Summing up, each governance structure has inherent strengths and weaknesses with respect 
to creating and sustaining a competitive advantage. In other words, the choice of how to 
access an asset involves tradeoffs. Needless to say, these tradeoffs should be taken into 
account when making the governance choice. In particular, the analysis points to the value of 
adding governance choice to the long list of isolating mechanisms5 presented in Mahoney and 
Pandian (1992), which to my knowledge has not been noted before. 
An important consideration has not been developed. I have discussed some inherent 
strengths and weaknesses of each governance structure with respect to creating and sustaining 
competitive advantage as seen from the perspective of a focal firm. However, for an inherent 
strength to be a strength for the focal firm, some of the gain from accessing an asset in a 
superior way has to accrue to the firm (Barney, 1986). In this discussion, the terms of access 
and costs of bargaining take center stage. For instance, buying an asset to enable 
differentiation does not give a firm a competitive advantage if the price it has to pay for the 
asset exceeds the gain that would result from denying competitors access. Thus, underlying 
the governance choice is a bargaining game that will split the gains from trade, and involves 
appropriation attempts and signaling from all parties involved, potentially dissipating the 
gains (Foss, 2002). 
These considerations are undoubtedly important to fully understand the effects of 
governance choice. However, the aim of the current work has been to show that governance 
choice matters for competitive strategy, and to take some initial steps towards a TCE theory 
of competitive strategy by developing some inherent attributes of governance structures that 
are relevant to the issue of sustained competitive advantage. Arguably, it has merit to 
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establish the implications of the inherent strengths and weaknesses before moving on to 
considering the bargaining game involved. Particularly because the bargaining game is also 
going to revolve around other factors than those developed here. Additionally, the focus 
emphasizes the interests of the firm. This is interesting by itself to establish the motivations of 
the firm, but also a necessary step for establishing the proceedings of the bargaining game, as 
understanding the bargaining game involves understanding the position of each party. In other 
words, to be able to understand the behavior of a firm bargaining for access to an asset we 
first need to establish the costs and benefits of the firm from accessing the asset in different 
ways. For these reasons I will not attempt to spell out the bargaining game in detail at present. 
However, some implications below involve thoughts on the bargaining game. 
 
4. Some Implications of the Framework 
 
The overall implication is that governance choices influence the firm’s competitive ability, 
and hence, issues of competitive strategy should loom large in the calculation when making 
governance choices. There are tradeoffs to consider, and the exact tradeoff and whether there 
is value to be gained from accessing an asset one way or the other depends on the asset in 
question and the competitive strategy. The characteristics of the asset in question influences 
the value of each governance attribute, and the competitive strategy influences the weight that 
should be put on each. These points are elaborated below, followed by some more loosely 
developed implications. 
Consider the first point, i.e. that the characteristics of the asset will influence the 
choice. For example, some assets will gain no value from being protected, while others will 
gain substantial value from being protected. One can expect the former to be governed 
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“further towards” the market than the latter, ceteris paribus. For instance, if a firm has a 
patent on a product and is competing in a market with a well-functioning judicial system, it 
should have no problem protecting the competitive advantage stemming from the product. 
The circumstances inherently protect the asset, and the governance attribute of protection thus 
has little value. Thus, the production can be outsourced without affecting the competitive 
value of the asset in this respect. If the firm, on the other hand, either did not have a patent or 
was competing in a market where the judicial system could not be relied on for adequate 
protection, the asset would not be inherently protected. Hence, the attribute of protection 
would have more value, and it would be more likely that the firm produced the product itself 
to protect the competitive advantage stemming from knowledge of the production procedure. 
A study by Argyres (1996) supports this proposition. He describes how the choice to insource 
parts of wire and cable production in the firm he examines was in some cases driven by the 
wish to protect proprietary knowledge. 
Consider the other point, that the competitive strategy influences the value of each 
attribute. This can be either because the overall competitive strategy has a general effect on 
the way assets are accessed, or because of the specific role the competitive strategy assigns 
the asset in question. If the competitive strategy has led the firm to compete in a market where 
end products are similar (close substitutes to buyers), price becomes an important competitive 
factor and the firm’s strategy should emphasize having low costs in order to create a 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). Two characteristics of market governance that 
underpins this goal are low bureaucratic costs and the ability to terminate access to assets (the 
later so no unneeded costs are incurred). Thus, the prediction is a general push in the direction 
of market for accessing assets. In this respect the framework suggests a word of caution: If a 
firm relies excessively on outsourcing, it is at the risk of diluting its competitive advantage as 
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the ability to protect is weakened. On the other hand, if the competition is between 
differentiated products, protecting access to assets that contribute to differentiating the end 
product becomes vital, while the concern for costs is less pronounced (Porter, 1985). Thus, a 
push towards hierarchy for governing these assets is predicted. 
Now to the point that the strategy can assign a role to the asset that influences how it is 
accessed. If a firm’s strategy is to sustain its competitive advantage by accessing some asset 
that it believes can deter entry, then commitment to the asset and to using the asset for the 
relevant purpose becomes crucial. Here the framework shows an interesting tradeoff to 
consider. If the asset in question is not specific to a particular use or to the firm, then 
commitment will have to be weakened in some respect. The most likely governance candidate 
is hybrid, where the firm can create a strong commitment to the asset, while maintaining a 
semi-strong commitment to not alter the asset, and thus use it for the relevant purpose. Again, 
the nature of the asset makes a difference. If the asset was inherently specific to the particular 
use, then the differential commitment ability of governance structures in that respect becomes 
less important, and the issue of commitment should be more focused on committing to the 
asset itself – thus, enabling the firm to access the asset by hierarchy. 
Now follow some more random implications. If a firm is considering accessing an asset 
and it believes the terms to be very favorable, it should consider whether there would be a 
benefit from protecting the terms of access. If the terms are favorable due to other parties 
having too pessimistic expectations, and the firm believes these will become more optimistic 
in time, protecting access to the asset at the favorable terms has merit. Otherwise, the terms 
will expectedly be changed as other parties realize the value of the asset. Thus, a push towards 
the hierarchical governance structure would be expected. If, on the other hand, the firm does 
not believe that the expectations of other parties will change, the need to protect the favorable 
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terms is not as great, and there is no push towards the hierarchy on this account. Naturally, the 
opposite argument applies if the firm believes the terms of access will improve or that the 
value of the asset will fall. 
A related implication arises when the firm’s competitive strategy will lead to increased 
reliance on access to an asset. This argument also draws in some tentative considerations on 
the bargaining game. As the reliance will increase the firm should consider whether the 
dependency leads to a situation that can be exploited by the owner. One factor influencing this 
is the competition facing the supplier of access. The better the competition in the market for 
access to a particular kind of asset, the more secure are the terms of access, as the terms of 
access of one owner will be kept in check by the competition. Thus, relying on an asset that is 
supplied in a competitive environment through market mechanisms presents a small threat of 
altered terms of access. At the other extreme, the firm might expect to rely increasingly on an 
asset that is supplied by a monopoly. In this situation, the value of protecting the terms of 
access is higher as the reliance can be exploited opportunistically by the supplier. In other 
words, ceteris paribus, the more the competition in supplying access to an asset approaches a 
monopoly (either because the number of suppliers is small or because there are few close 
substitutes available), the further towards hierarchy can we expect the access to vital assets to 
be governed6. 
Another implication is that high uncertainty as to the future value of an asset leads to 
the use of governance structures that are flexible with respect to terminating access. That is, a 
move from either hierarchy or inflexible hybrids to more flexible hybrids or market. This is 
similar to the proposition advanced by Argyres and Liebeskind (1999).  
However, the nature of the uncertainty is important. Flexibility to terminate is valuable 
when uncertainty is more “dramatic” – that is, uncertainty that entails a risk of the asset losing 
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value or possibly results in other assets being superior. If the uncertainty is of a less dramatic 
kind, adjusting the use of the assets might be the optimal action to take. In this respect the 
hierarchy is superior, as it is most flexible when it comes to altering the asset. For instance, if 
the asset is used to produce a product for some specific market, and the uncertainty concerns 
the viability of the market itself, then market governance tends to be superior. If the 
uncertainty concerns how the nature of the market will be and thus how exactly the asset 
should be used, then hierarchy tends to be superior. 
Although the framework is ill equipped to address innovation, a tentative implication 
can be forwarded. One would expect innovate firms that rely on continually improving their 
product to govern assets by hierarchy, as this provides the largest potential for coordination, 
as well as the best ability to protect developments from competitors. However, as Coombs 
and Metcalfe (2000) note, firms are increasingly collaborating for innovation. The 
observation is not necessarily inconsistent with my analysis above when noting their 
discussion of science and technology. Namely, branches of science are becoming increasingly 
specialized, while a wider array of sciences is used in collaboration in production. Thus, if 
more branches of science are needed to produce each input and the sciences are increasingly 
specialized, then it is very cost inefficient for a firm to engage in producing all these inputs 
itself. The investment needed to support each input becomes larger as several complex 
technologies are needed. Thus, the firm governance structure becomes inferior for cost 
reasons, and hybrids are used instead, even though coordination and protection is lost this 
way. An interesting corollary can be forwarded. Should it be the case that several firms 
collaborate in the use of some technology, one would expect from my analysis that they 
would (if possible) not be direct competitors – if they use the technology towards different 
ends, the value of the asset to each would be higher as each can have a differentiated product 
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and thus create a competitive advantage (as they are not competing). If they were competitors, 
the benefit would only be towards other competitors than the ones they are collaborating with, 
as Coombs and Metcalfe (2000) also point out. 
 
5. Competitive Strategy Driving General Motor’s Acquisition of 
Fisher Body 
 
General Motors’ (GM) acquisition of Fisher Body (FB) in 1926 has become a classic case in 
the theory of the firm since it was first introduced by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978). 
Klein (1988, 1996, 2000) has since elaborated on the case, and defended his interpretation 
against attacks. The gist of the original story is the following: Prior to 1919, FB was 
supplying GM with auto bodies at market terms. Around 1919, auto producers increasingly 
shifted from using open bodies to closed bodies. Production of closed bodies required 
investment in dies specific to the auto manufacturer, and to induce FB to make these 
investments GM signed 10-year supply contract with FB in 1919. The contract specified that 
GM would buy all closed car bodies from FB. To avoid that FB ex post used the exclusive 
contract to raise the price of auto bodies unreasonably, the contract specified that the price of 
bodies should be set at costs plus 17,6% (excluding capital costs). At the same time GM 
bought a 60% share of FB stock. Thus, GM’s access to FB went from being governed by 
market to being governed by hybrid. In the following years, the market evolved unexpectedly. 
Specifically, the demand for closed bodies soared. This put strains in the relationship, as GM 
found the agreed on price too high due to the increase in production pr. unit of capital. The 
contract also led FB to use inefficient (costly) labor-intensive production techniques. At the 
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same time, GM wanted FB to relocate a plant closer to a GM production facility to realize 
production economies. FB was reluctant to do this, as it would result in a large specific 
investment on FB’s part. In the end, GM found the contract intolerable, and ended up 
purchasing the remaining FB stocks in 1926. Thus, the explanation for the move from market 
over hybrid to hierarchy is to economize on the transaction costs that result from strains 
associated with specific investments when the environment is uncertain and contracts are 
incomplete. This explanation is in line with the TCE framework of Williamson (1985, 1991), 
who also uses the case as an example. 
It has since been argued that it was not specific investments and the associated “hold 
up” that led to the acquisition, and alternative explanations for the development have been 
forwarded (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000; Coase, 2000; Freeland 2000; Langlois 
and Robertson, 1989). I do not find the explanations mutually exclusive. In fact, the bulk of 
the new explanations are consistent with the framework I have laid out above, and can 
therefore be folded within a TCE perspective. 
There are several reasons why the move helped create a competitive advantage for 
GM. Around the time of the acquisition, the competition in the auto market shifted from a 
focus on price to a focus on style and appearance (Freeland, 2000). This decreased the 
importance of low costs, while the focus on style and appearance increased the potential to 
create a competitive advantage by coordinating the design and assembly of body and chassis 
of the autos (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000; Freeland, 2000). Simultaneously GM 
chose to make yearly models, in part to stimulate demand as novelty became important to 
buyers (Freeland, 2000; Langlois and Robertson, 1989). This created a need to continually 
coordinate design and assembly, enhancing the value of the ability to coordinate. Also, as 
styling became a significant part of the competitive strategy, GM was unwilling to leave the 
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control of a key part of this in the hands of others (Freeland, 2000). In fact, Sloan (president 
of GM at the time of the acquisition) explained the merger in terms of “operating economies 
to be gained by co-ordinating body and chassis assembly” (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 
2000, p. 94). These considerations led the governance choice to be pushed towards hierarchy. 
This is consistent with the framework forwarded, as an increase in the value of coordination 
to create a competitive advantage and decrease in the value of low bureaucratic costs should 
lead to a push towards hierarchical governance. 
Up through the 1920s, the competitive strategy of GM relied increasingly on FB 
bodies to differentiate their autos. FB was among the first to specialize in the production of 
closed bodies. The FB closed bodies had in this way gained a reputation in the public, and 
were known for quality and craftsmanship, and signaled comfort and luxury. Furthermore, 
they possessed a distinct look (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000). This made their use 
ideal for differentiating autos from autos that did not use FB bodies. For a period leading up 
to the acquisition, GM was unsatisfied that FB bodies were being used in competitors’ autos. 
After acquiring FB, GM excluded competitors from access to FB, and achieved a competitive 
advantage by being able to differentiate their autos in this manner (Freeland, 2000). In other 
words, hierarchical governance allowed GM to exclude competitors from access to FB, 
creating a competitive advantage. Thus, the importance of differentiating the end product and 
the importance of FB in this respect led access to FB to be pushed towards hierarchy, 
consistent with the framework above. There was another way differentiation played a role. In 
the 1920s, the market for used autos grew significantly. This resulted in new competition for 
auto manufacturers, and thus a need to differentiate new autos from used autos (Langlois and 
Robertson, 1989). This was an important reason for introducing yearly model changes, which, 
as explained above, led to the increased value of coordination. 
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The move was also motivated by an effort to sustain the competitive advantage. One 
reason the initial long-term contract was signed was that GM feared losing access to FB. The 
fear arose as GM learned that Ford had placed a large order with FB and that at least two 
other auto manufacturers were attempting to forge alliances with FB (Coase, 2000; Freeland, 
2000). While Ford was an innovator in auto manufacturing, GM was very much a follower, 
and losing access to FB would mean falling further behind (Langlois and Robertson, 1989). 
Also, the move was taken in anticipation of the future importance of closed bodies, and a fear 
of a subsequent price increase facing a thin supply market (Freeland, 2000; Langlois and 
Robertson, 1989). As the reliance on FB grew, GM increasingly worried about losing access 
to FB (Langlois and Robertson, 1989). Specifically, GM feared that the 40% stake in FB 
might fall into unfriendly hands (Coase, 2000; Freeland, 2000). Also, periods of undersupply 
were a problem while at the same time competitors were being supplied (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Spulber, 2000; Freeland, 2000). This influenced the decision to acquire FB. In other 
words, protecting the access to FB to sustain the competitive advantage was influential in 
driving governance first to hybrid and later to hierarchy. 
Summing up, competitive strategy was influential in driving the governance choices, 
and the alternative explanations that have been forwarded are consistent with the framework I 
have laid out. Having said this, the case also points to the shortcoming of the framework, as 
Langlois and Robertson (1989) emphasize innovative aspects as determinative. Again, this 
points to an area where future work could be productive. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
This study has shown how the choice of governance structure for accessing an asset 
inherently affects the firm’s ability to create and sustain its competitive advantage. There is a 
tradeoff to consider in which transaction costs and contractual issues play a crucial role. 
The analysis points to the usefulness of applying TCE to competitive strategy, and to the 
shortcomings of the traditional TCE framework in explaining governance choice. The 
integration of RBV and IO notions for explaining competitive advantage and the TCE 
treatment of governance structures points to the merit of integrative work in issues of 
competitive strategy. 
The work is not complete. Issues of learning and knowledge are largely ignored and 
only tentative remarks were made on the bargaining game between the firm and other parties. 
However, having established some inherent attributes of governance structures related to 
competitive advantage is a first step. Other attributes can be added, and the bargaining game 
better understood once these attributes are nailed down. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Wernerfelt (1984) goes on to speak of resources as assets that are tied semipermanently to  
the firm. In this respect my concept of assets differ, as a central point of my analysis is that a 
firm can rely on assets for competing without the assets being tied to the firm. Tying the 
assets to the firm is a choice that will affect the competitive advantage. 
2 In fact, Porter (1985) considers three generic strategies, making a distinction between 
targeting a whole industry and focusing on a segment. It is unclear why the two are inherently 
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different, especially as it is unclear what constitutes an industry (p. 272). In both cases 
attention has to be made to competitors competing more narrowly, competitors competing 
with the same scope, and competitors competing more broadly. 
3 Peteraf (1993) notes how asset specificity creates immobility and in this way helps sustain 
the competitive advantage. In this respect, TCE is informative by pointing to how transaction 
costs create this “lock-in”. As Peteraf (1993) has already sketched the implications and the 
present analysis is concerned with how the governance choice affects the competitive 
advantage, I will only treat the issue when governance structures inherently differ in this 
respect. 
4 As also emphasized by Argyres and Liebeskind (1999). 
5 Isolating mechanisms refer to phenomena that sustain competitive advantage. 
6 These considerations resemble the hold-up argument often encountered in TCE (Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). However, the competitive situation might 
create reliance (seen from the perspective of the firm) that does not involve specific assets. 
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Table 
 
Table 1    
Inherent strengths and weaknesses of governance structures for a firm accessing an 
asset 
 Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Creating competitive advantage    
     Differentiation 0 + ++ 
     Low bureaucratic costs ++ + 0 
     Coordination 0 + ++ 
Sustaining competitive advantage    
     Protection 0 + ++ 
     Flexibility    
           To terminate access ++ +/0 +/0 
           To alter the asset 0 + ++ 
     Commitment    
            To asset 0 +/++ +/++ 
            To use of asset ++ + 0 
++  =  strong;  +  =  semi-strong;  0  =  weak  
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1 Wernerfelt (1984) goes on to speak of resources as assets that are tied semipermanently to the firm. In this 
respect my concept of assets differ, as a central point of my analysis is that a firm can rely on assets for 
competing without the assets being tied to the firm. Tying the assets to the firm is a choice that will affect the 
competitive advantage. 
2 In fact, Porter (1985) considers three generic strategies, making a distinction between targeting a whole 
industry and focusing on a segment. It is unclear why the two are inherently different, especially as it is unclear 
what constitutes an industry (p. 272). In both cases attention has to be made to competitors competing more 
narrowly, competitors competing with the same scope, and competitors competing more broadly. 
3 Peteraf (1993) notes how asset specificity creates immobility and in this way helps sustain the competitive 
advantage. In this respect, TCE is informative by pointing to how transaction costs create this “lock-in”. As 
Peteraf (1993) has already sketched the implications and the present analysis is concerned with how the 
governance choice affects the competitive advantage, I will only treat the issue when governance structures 
inherently differ in this respect. 
4 Also emphasized by Argyres and Liebeskind (1999). 
5 Isolating mechanisms refer to phenomena that sustain competitive advantage. 
6 These considerations resemble the hold-up argument often encountered in TCE (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 
1978; Williamson, 1985). However, the competitive situation might create reliance (seen from the perspective of 
the firm) that does not involve specific assets. 
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